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In the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah
District Court of Juab CountyCivil No. 3763
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ORVIL ANDREWS, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants
District Court of Juab CountyCivil No. 3768
ORVIL ANDREWS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants

CASE
NO. 8745

District Court of Juab CountyCivil No. 3770
GERALD FOWKES, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Respondents
and Cross Appellants,
vs.
CURRENT CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants_)

Brief of Respondents and Cross Appellants Fowkes
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The three above entitled eases w&e consolidated for
trial and one set of Findings of Fact, ·Oonclus~ons of Law,
and Decree was entered. The only case in which Gerald
Fowkes, Elma Tietjen Fowkes, Heber J. Fowkes and John
L. Fowkes are parties is ,case number 3770, and they comprise all of the plaintiffs in that ·case. This brief, therefore is in answer to those portions of the brief of appellant
Ctwrent Creek Irrigation Company, and appellant OrvH
Andrmvs, et al, which apply to Case Number 3770.
We will endeavor to follow the same designation of
parties herein as is set rorth in the Appellants' Brief, i. e.,
in ·Case Number 3770, plaintiff and cross appellants, Gerald

Fowkes, and Elma Tietjen Fowkes, his wife, Heber J.
Fowkes, and John L. Fowkes will :be collectively referred

to as "Fowkes"; defendant and appellant ·Current Creek
Irrigation Company will be referred to as the "Irrigation
Company'', and defendants and appellants, Orvil Andrews,
Neldon V. Andrews, R. Delos Andrews, Eldon Vemess Andrews, Oral Calvert Taylor, and Laveda A. Taylor, will be
collectively referred to as ''Andrews''; defendant and· re~.
spondent Joseph M. Tracy, State Engineer of the State of
Utah, will be referred to as "State Engineer"; defendant,
Utah Water and Power Board, will be refe,rred to as "Water and Power Board". With respect to the designation of
the record, we will refer to the large transcript of the proecedings in Case Number 3770, as (R. _ _ _ ), and to the
small tran..c;;;cript of the proceedings in Case Nwnber 3770,
held on Oetuber 3, 19rs·6, relative to 1h.e preUminary injunc..
tion as (Vol. 2, P. _ _ _ ). Other references will specifically designate the document.
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STATEMENT OF CASE

In Case Number 3770, Fowkes sought the following

relief:

·

(1) To enjoin the Irrigation Company and Water and
Power Board from diverting and using water from one 16
inch flowing well, and four 12 inch flowing wells (collectively referred to herein as Irrigation Company Wells) sit-

uated near the approximate east shore area of the Mona
Reservoir, in Juab County, and for damages sustained by
Fowkes during the years 1955 and 1956, resulting from the
operation of the Irrigation Company Wells.

(2) To enjoin Andrews from diverting and using water from a 16 inch pump well (referred to herein as Andrews Pump Well) situated approximately % mile southeasterly from FOW'kes' wells, and for damages sustained
during the years 1955 and 1956, resulting from the operation

m the Andrews Pump Well.

(3) To reverse and set aside the decision of the State
Engineer in approving change application number a-2786,
owned by the Irrigation Company, and Water and Power
Board.
The trial court enjoined Andrews from diverting wa,ter from the Andrews Ptnnp Well, and enjoined the Irrigation Company, and Water and Power Board from diverting water from the five Irrigation Company flowing wells,
unless and until Andrews and the Irrigation Company replaced to Fbwkes 1.775 second feet of water during the
irrigation season, and 27.11 gallons per minute of water
during the non-irrigation season on the surface of the
ground, and to plaintiff Gerald ·Fowkes, sufficient water to
irrigate an additional ten acres of ground theretofore irrigated from a spring. Both Andrews and the Irrigation
Company appeal from this ruling. The trial court found
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
that Fowkes had been damaged $1500.00, but denied recovery thereof because it found Fowkes had a duty to mitigate their damages, and failed tn do so. Fowkes filed a
cross appeal from rthe Findings of the trial court that ·Fowkes
had a duty under the facts in this ~case 1Jo mitigate their
damages and from the holding of the trial ·court that Fowkes
are not entitled to recover their damages because of their
failure to mitigate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Fowkes agree with the basic facts set forth in the respective briefs of the Irrigation Company and Andrews
insofar as they apply to Case Nmnber 3770, although
Fowkes disagree with some of the conclusions appearing
therein. We believe it more advisalble and less confusing
to make a separate statement of facts mther than specify
those with which we disagree and point out those that may
or may not be supported only \by the evidence in Cases Nos.
3763 and 3768, in which Fowkes were nQt parties.

Fowkes are the owners of the right to the use of underground water diverted by means of 11 flowing wells
situated along Highway 91, approximately 4 miles nortih.
of Mona, Utah. The rights to the use of underground water from the 11 flawing wells are evidenced by the following underground water claims filed in the State Engineer•
Office (Frind.ing No. 3, Pages 166, 167; Pl. Ex. 1).

Priority

Flow of
Water

Dia. of
Well

3097
3098

1912
1914
1918

70 GPM
60 GPM
50 GPM

3099

1920

3108
3109

1907
1912

50 GPM
5 GPM
2 GPM

6-in.
6-in.
3-in.
3-in.
2-in.
2-in.

3096

Depth

90ft.
75ft.
90 ft .
90 ft.

75ft.
16 ft.
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4392
' 4393

104to·
10471
10472

1915
1920
1918
. 1922
1918

5
5
175
200
175
797

GPM
GPM
GPM
GPM
GPM
GPM

=

150
6-in..
2-in.
240
6-in.
67
6-in.
67
6-in.
68
1.775 CFS

ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.

In addition to the foregoing, Gerald Fowkes is the owner of the right to the use of water from a spring situated
on his property to irrigate 10 acres of land (Finding No.
6, P. 167; R. 77, 84, 91, 118, 119).

Andrews are the owners of the right to the use of the
water from a number of flowing wells evidenced by underground water claims filed in the State Engineer's Office,
as set forth on page 5 of their brief. Andrews also have
initiated the right to appropriate underground water under
Application No. 21443, by means of a 16 inch diameter pump
well (referred to herein as Andrews Pump Well) and Application No. 21444 by means of a well not yet drilled, as set
forth on page 5 of their brief. In addition ·thereto, Andrews
are the owners of the right to the use of water from a certain spring situated on their property for irrigation purposes as set forth on page 5 of their brief.
The Irrigation Company has initiated the right to appropriate 18 second feet of underground water under Application No.. 22760, from three wells and as amended by
Change Application No. a-2786, from five wells as outlined
on pages 6 ·and 7 of Andrews' brief. Under Application No.
22760, as amended by Change Application No. a-2786, the
Irrigation Company diverts underground water by means
of its wells during the entire year, i. e., from January·! to
December 31, and stores the water so diverted in a surface
reservoir, known as Mona Reservoir, from which the water is released from April 1 to November 1, together with
oth~~ water stored in the reservoir, and conveyed a distance

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
of approximately twelve miles, where it is used for irrigation purposes (Pl. Ex. "E", ,Case Number 3763).
The Andrews Pump Well was drilled in 1951, and was
pumped during the period shown on pages 22 and 23 of Andrews' brief, and during the practically entire irrigation
season of 1956, as shown on Pl. Ex. P8 and P9. The five
Irrigation Company Flowing Wells we~re drilled during the
years 1951 and 1954, on the respective dates shorwn on page
6 of Andrews' brief, and water was continuously diverted
therefrom during the whoJe of each and every year with
the e~ception of a few isolated times during the period of
November, 1955, to June, 1956 (Complaint Par. 13, P. 4, 5;
Answer Par. 5, P. 25,).
All of the wells in question are situated on an alluvial
fan running from east to west from the Wasatch Range of
mountains in North Juab Valley. There are many of such
alluvial fans along the Wasatch front in the valley. The
valley is bounded on the east hy the precipitous and rugged
Wasatch Mountains culminating in Mount Nebo, which pro.
jects to an elevation of 11,887 feet above sea level and towers 7,000 feet above the center of the valley less than five
miles distant (Pl. Ex. 2) . The valley constitutes a structural trough and is bounded on the north by a relatively
low natural dike and on the south by the Levan Ridge. The
areal extent of the artesian basin is relatively small and is
embraced by the alluvial fan in which the wells are located.
The Irrigation Company Wells are situated along the toe
of the alluvial fan (R. 159). The Fowkes flowing wells are
situated higher up on the fan (R. 151, 152, Pl. Ex. 2), and
the Andrews Pump Well 1s situated higher on the :ean approximately one-half mile southeasterly from the Fowkes
Wells (R. 189; Vol. 2, P. 17). The FOIW'kes flowing wells and
the Irrigation Company flowing wells are interconnected,
and the Fowkes flowing wells and the Andrews Pump Well
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are interconnected (Vol. 2, P. 28, 30, R. 156). The drilling
and use of water from the Andrews Pump Well and from
the Irrigation Company flowing wells have jnterferred with
and have interrupted the flow of water from the Fowkes
flowing wells, and the spring of Gerald Fowkes (Fmding
No. 12, P. 168). The foregoing is conclusively established
by the evidence (P. Ex. 5, 6, P 8, P9; Vol. 2, P. 24 to 32;
R. 14, 15; 155, 156, 172, 173, 189, 197). The Irrigation
Company admits the foregoing to ~be the fact on pages 7,
8, and 9 of their brief. The hydrostatic pressure in Fowkes
flowing wells decreased from approximately 11.5 feet above
the ground surface, at the beginning of 1953 (Pl. Ex. 5)
to approximately 8.5 feet below the groWld surface on October 6, 1956 (Ex. CC-2, Case No. 3763), or a total decrease
of 20 feet. The total reduction in hydrostatic head is substantially the Same for all of the old flowing wells (R. 35).
The principal source of supply for Fowkes wells is from
the drainage of the mountains to the east (Vol 2, P. 62;
R. 21, 43, 151, 152) and that any development of underground water in the Nephi Area being approximately 10
riiiles south of the wells in question (Vol. 2, P. 62) could
not materially affect the Fowkes wells (R. 21, 28, 44, 159,
168, 196). Prior to the diversion of water by means of the
Andrews Pump Well and the Irrigation Company Wells,
the Fowkes wells had never stopped flowing, even during
the drouth years of 1934 and 1935 (Ex. P12; Vol. 2, P. 64;
R. 77). The withdrawal of undergronnd water during the
year 1956 caused a total reduction in the ground water surface, as shown by the hydrographs on well number 10639,
from minus 1.9 feet on December 31, 1955 (Pl. Ex. 6A),
to minus 5.83 feet on Decetnber 31, 1956 (Ex. CC2, Case
Nwnber 3763, or a net reduction of 3.93 feet. In the opin·
ion of the expert witnesses, Gardner and Hansen, the
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present rate of withdrawal was exceeding the present rate
of rechcurge (R. 54, 69, 70; R. 202).
The trial court found that Fowkes suffered a pecuniary
loss for crops not grown, and for hauling water during the
period in controversy, in the sum of $1500.00 (Finding No.
16, P. 169). The evidence adequately supports the for&going Finding (R. 75-88, incl.; 107-116 incl.; 132-140 incl.).
The trial court further found that F1owkes could have mitigated their damages by taking the necessary steps to secure water which was still available from the underground
basin during the existence of this controversy, and by reason thereof Fowkes are not entitled to claim damages for
loss of crops and for hauling water (Finding 16, P. 169).
Mr. J. S. Lee, a well driller, who drilled the five Irrigation
Company wells and the Andrews Pump Well (R. 208), testified that it would require one twelve inch well approximately 300 feet deep to produce approximately 800 gallons
per minute, being the approximate total amount (797 GPM)
to which the Fowkes are entitled (R. 211, Pl. Ex. l) . The
cost to drill such a well would be $14.00 per foot or $4200.00
(R. 211). In addition thereto, it would cost approximately
$3500.00 to equip the well with a pump suitaJble to lift the
water (R. 213). The combined cost for drilling such a well,
plus equipping the same with a suitable pump would be
$7,700.00. In addition thereto, there would fbe the cost of
the suitaJble transformer and the! cost of pumping. The
Fowkes wells consist of six 6 inch diameter casings, two 3
inch diameter casings, and three 2 inch diameter casings
(Pl. Ex. 1). Mr. Lee testified that it would cost approximately $750.00 for each pump for each 6 inch well (R. 213).
He further testified that it would cost aJpproximately $250.00
to equip each domestic well with a pump (R. 216). In addition thereto, each 6 inch well would have to be pump tested to determine the draw down and size of pumping equip-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
at $200.00 per well, or a total m $1200.00 (R. 224). The
total east to equip such wells with adequate pumps would
be $6,95q.oo, according 1Jo the testimony of Mr. Lee. According to the testimony of Mr. Madsen, as is demonstrated
by Ex. W20, 1:Jhe ~cost to equip a 6 inch well with a pump,
motor a.I).d transformer would be $1015.00 per well (Ex.
W20; R. 233). Ex:hibit W20 further shows that the cost
to equip one 4 inch well with a motor and transformer would
be $812.00 to pump 60 gallons per minute with a 50 foot
lift. Using the figures of Mr. Madsen, the total cost to
equip the 6 inch wells with adequate facilities would be
$6090.00, and the cost to equip the two 3 inch wells would
be $1624.00. The cost to equip the three 2 inch wells, using the figures of Mr. Lee, would be $750.00. The total cost,
therefore, to equip Fowkes wells with adequate facilities
would be $8464.00. The trial court therefore rules in effect that Fowkes had a duty to expend between $6950.00
and $8464.00, to mitigate $1500.00 damages. From this ruling, the Fowkes filed their cross appeal (Cross Appeal and
Statement of Points, Page 188).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
We shall follow the general order of the points designated in Appellant Irrigation Company's brief, although
our statement of points may be couched in somewhat different language. We shall separately discuss Point 6 of
Appellants Andrews' brief, set forth· on page 16 thereof,
and designated herein as Point No. 4~ The other pointS
raised by appellant Andrews do not present any controversy between Fowkes and Andrews. Fowkes desire to
present two additional points, which are combined into
Point 5 herein, and will be fully discussed hereafter. We
shall endeavor to cover each point in the order enwnerated.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT UNDER- THE APPR,OPRIATIONS OF UNDE·RGROUND WATER BY PLAINTIFFS FO,WKES IN CASE
NO. 3770, THE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT TO, USE
ARTESIAN PRESSURE AS THEIR MEANS OF DIVERSION.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS
ORDER REQUIRING REPLACEMENT OF THE WATER,
IN THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE
QUANTITY OF WATER APPROPRIATED BY THE VARIOUS PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NUMBER 3770,
TO SUPPO·RT THE ORDER FO·R REPLACEMENT.

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING THE
IRRIGATION COMPANY AND ANDREWS TO EACH
REPLACE HALF THE WATED. AND THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECO'RD TO SUPPORT AN APPORTIONMENT OF REPLACEMENT COST, AND THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN OO·NCLUDING THAT THE
ONLY CAUSE FO,R DIMUNITION IN THE PLAINTIFF'S
WELL WAS INTERFERENCE BY ANDREWS AND
THE IRRIGATION CO,MPANY.

POINT IV
'!'HE DECREE OF TIIE TRIAL COURT INSOFAR
AS IT AWARDED· INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND ORDERED REPLACEMENT TO FOWKES WAS PROPER.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINA-
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TIO'N THAT UNDER THE FACTS OF TillS CASE
FOWKES HAD A DUTY TO MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES AND IN HOLDING THAT FOWKES ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR D:AMAGES FOR LOSS
OF CROPS AND FOR HAULING WATER BECAUSE
THEY FAILED TO MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT UND~R THE APPRO·PRIATIONS OF UNDERGROUND WATER BY PLAINTIFFS FOWKES IN CASE
NO. 3770, THEY ACQUffiED A VESTED RIGHT TO USE
ARTESIAN PRESSURE AS THEIR MEANS OF DIVERSION.
In Point No. 1 of appellant Irrigation Company's brief,
it is stated that the trial court held that Fowkes have a
vested right to have artesian pressure and ground water
levels maintained at such an elevation to pennit them to
get their water through their shallow existing wells without pwnping. The trial court did not so hold. The trial
court did hold that Fowkes had made valid appropriations
of the underground waters by means of artesian pressure
and that under their appropriations they acquired a vested
right to use the artesian pressure as their means of diversion which would be protected as against subsequent appropriators. The trial court did not hold that Fowkes had
an absolute vested right to have the artesian conditions
preserved, but held that since the artesian conditions in
the Fowkes wells had been destroyed by the combined operations of the Irrigation Company wells and the Andrews
Pump Well, the Fowkes means of diversion had been impaired and ·rendered useless. The Irrigation Company and
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Andrews were ordered to replace the water to Fowkes on
the surface of the ground and that any expense incurred
in altering the Fowkes means of diversion to obtain such
water must be borne equally by the Imgation Company
and Andrews. The Irrigation Company 'Was enjoined from
operating its five flowing wells, and Andrews were enjoined
from operating their pump well unless and until replacement of the water to Fowkes is made. We submit that the
holding of the trial court was proper, and is in accordance
with the principles of law as pronounced time and time again
by this Court.
The Irrigation Company and Andrews both admit that
Fowkes have made valid appropriations of underground
water by means of their wells, although the Irrigation Company argues under Point 11 of its brief, that Fowkes failed
to prove the quantity of water to which they are entitled.
The latter will be covered separately under Point No. n
herein.
The basic issue presented by this appeal, therefore,
becomes whether the prior appropriators of underground
water, who made their appropriations prior to 1935, by using artesian pressure as their means of diversion, acquired
a vested right to use artesian pressure as their means of
diversion. When, as here, the artesian pressure has been
reduced by diversions of junior appropriators so as to render the means of diversion of rfhe prior appropriators useless, the issue becomes one of who, as between the prior
appropriators and the junior apropriators, must bear the
expense replacing the water to the prior appropriators. If
the prior appropriators acquired a vested right to use artesian pressure to divert his wateT, then the junior appropriators should bear the e~nse. If not, the prior appropriartors must bear the expense.
The evidence is conclusive that the diversion of water

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
by means of the Irrigation Company flowing wells and the
Andrews Pump We~l have ·caused the Fowkes wells to cease
flowing. There is no dispute that as against the Irrigation
Company flowing wells and the Andrews Pump Well,
Fowkes .have the prior right to· the use of the underground
water. . Andrews do not dispute that Fowkes acquired a
vested right to use artesian pressure as the means of their
diversion. In fact, Andrews assert the same right in their
flowing wells as against the Irrigation Company. Insofar
as Fowkes are concerned, the diSpute resolves itself .into
one between Fowkes and the Irrigation Company.
We call attention to the fact that the Fowkes wells are
used for irrigation, domestic and stock watering purposes
from which 1.775 sec. ft. of water are diverted as compared
to the 2.74 second feet of water diverted by means of the
Inigation Company's flowing wells. The priorities of. the
Fowkes wells run from .1907 to 1922, whereas the priorities
of the Irrigation Company's flowing wells are as late as
1951. We here emphasize the fact that the dispute between
Fowkes and the Irrigation .Gompany is a flowing well vs.
flowing well controversy. The Irrigation Company has depleted the artesian pressure in the Fowkes wells, and have
in effect taken that very same artesian pressure to divert
their water from their five flowing wells. In face of this
fact, the Irrigation Company asserts that it has done no
wrong and if Fowkes want their water, they should be required to install pumping facilities at their own ~
and bear the perpetual cost of ptunping, while the Irrigation Company utilizes the very same artesian pressure
which it has taken away from Fowkes to divert its water
without any cost to it whatever. We shall demonstrate in
the following argument that the position of the Irrigation
Company is untenable and is contrary to the established
principles ot law.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
It is well settled in Utah that on a surface stream if
a subsequent appropriator were to lower the level of the
water of a stream, so that the size of the stream which was
diverted into a prior appropriator diverting works was
greatly diminished and he was thereJby put to an additional
~ in order to olbtain his water, the subsequent appropriator would certainly be liable for the added expense
which he caused to the prior appropriator. Salt Lake City
vs. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147. In the Gardner case,
supra, the defendant filed an application to appropriate water from Utah Lake by pumping directly from the lake.
Plaintiffs had appropriated watoc from the lake which in
part naturally flowed through the outlet and in part were
pumped. Defendant's diversion of water would lessen the
natural flow and increase the pumping lift of plaintiffs.
There was a large quantity of water in the bottom of the
lake ,which had not :been appropriated by plaintiffs, either
by natural flow or pumping. This Court ordered the application of defendant approved, but required defendant to
stand all the expense resulting to plaintiffs by diverting
the additional water.
On page 152 it was stated:
"We think the original taker or appropriator from a
stream or body of water also acquires the right to continue to use his method or means of diverting which
he has installed.''
After ctiscussing who should bear the expense of any
change in the prior appropriators' diverting works, this
Court stated on page 152 as foJ.lows:

"• • • If it be held, therefore, that a subsequent appropriator of water need have no regard for the diverting means or methods of the prior appropriatm-,
but may in fact or effect make prior appropriations of
water unavailable with impunity, then there is in fact
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no su~h a rig~t as a prior right~ but all rights may, at
any time, be mvaded or destroyed by a subsequent appropriator by simply making the diverting means used
by the prior appropriator useless. To permit such
an invasion of a prior right would, in effect, amount to
an indirect taking of a prior appropriator's water. This,
neither the legislative nor the judicial power can allow
without permitting confiscation of property rights."
On page 153 it is further stated:
"' ' ' If all rights can be protected and preserved, a
mere change in prior established means or methods of diversion, if possible, ought not to prevent the
use of water which could otherwise not be beneficially
applied. But, in our judgment, the risk of interferring
with prior rights and the cost of any change in the
prior appropriator's means or methods of diversion
should be assumed and borne by the subsequent ap-

propriator, and a court should in no cru;e permit a subsequent appropriation unless all prior rights can by
some feasible means be protected and maintained."
Although the waters involved in the Gardner case were
surface waters, there is in fact no distinction between th:e
Gardner case and the instant case. As a matter of fact,
Utah Lake would probably represent the most simple type
of underground water basin, different only in that the
body of water exists independently from the interwoven
stratum of sands and gravel.
All waters in this State, whether above or under the
ground, are declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof (73-1-1, UCA
1953). The Court is well aware of the confusion and chaos
which existed prior to 1935, in attempting to apply a different set of principles of la\V to surface water from those
applied to underground water. Since 1935, there has been
no statutory distinction between swface and underground
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water or in the application by the courts of the principles
of law with respect thereto. The principles of law atr
nounced by this Court in the Gardner case, supra, apply
wiith equal vigor to underground water, and the facts of
the instant case come squarely Within the principles announced therein.
Prior to 1935, the decisions of this Court treated the
water of artesian basins as peroolating water, and as such
were owned by the owner of the ground where such waters
were located as an incident to the ownm-ship of the ground,
and were not considered to be subject to appropriation.
Since such basins occupied subterranean areas, in which
there could be many owners, such that one owner could, by
withdrawing more than his share of the water of the basin,
deprive others of their proportionate share, this Court recognized the need for regulation, and for that purpose adopted what is known as the Doctrine of Correlative Rights.
Horne vs. utah Oil Refining Company, 59 Utah 279, 202
P. 815, 31 ALR, 883; Glover vs. Utah Oil Refining Oompany, 62 Utah 174, 218 P. 955, 31 ALR 900. The Horne
case, supra, was decided in 1921, and was recognized as
the law of this Staf.e until the decision of Wrathall vs. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d, 755, wherein it was held that the
law of appropriation applies to the waters of subterranean
and artesian hasins.
The Wrathall case was an action for damages and for
injunctive relief.. The complaint alleged that for 35 years
plaintiff had two, 2 inch flowing wells which had continuously delivered to the surface of the ground 15 gallons of
water per minute, and which pl.ainitill had beneficially used
for irrigation, domestic and culinary purposes. During
the fall and winter of 1927 ,and 1928, the defendant drilled
two 4 inch wells on the adjoining land into the same artesian basin, and in the month of July, 1929, defendants in-
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stalled an electric pump on one of their wells and pumped
180 gallons per minute theTefrom. It was further alleged
that thereafter plaintiff's wells decreased in flow and eventually ·ceased flowing entirely. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint, so the question on appeal was
whether the complaint stated a cause of action. This Court
held that the complaint did state a cause of action, and the
case was remanded to the trial court to hear the evidence.
Justice Moffat wrote the rmlln opinion, and Justice Ephraim
Hansen concurred without comment. Chief Justice Straup
conCU.ITed in a separate opinion. Although concurring with
the results, Justice Elias Hansen and Justice Folland wrote
vigorous and exhaustive dissenting opinions.
On page 777, Justice Moffat stated as follows:

"* * *

To permit an adjoining land owner to drive a
well and by natural flow or by pmnping or otherwise
dry up a neighbor's well_that had been driven and used
for over 35 years invades the rights of the neighbor,
destroys his prior appropriation, injures his vested and
'recognized· right, is actionable, or, if not, he whose
·right is thus invaded may still pray for rain, and unless
Providence be kinder than courts of law, he is without

remedy." (Emphasis ours).
It is here pointed out that in the Wrathall case the
complaint alleged a reduction in the hydrostatic pressure
of plaintiff's wen until eventually it stopped flowing. It
did not allege that defendant had exhausted plaintiff's
source of supply, although the complaint did allege that if
defendants were permitted to continue the opera.tion of
their pumps,, defendants would eventually exhaust the supply from the artesian basin.
. Chief Justice Straup, in his concurring opinion, was
of the opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action
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under either the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, or Correlative Rights. On page 790 he pointed out:

"• * * That he by artificial means drilled a pipe and
tapped the waters of the artesian basin, and thereby
brought them to the surface by natural and normal
pressure, and, as here, for 35 years, under claim of
right, openly diverted and beneficially used such waters, he, in principle, as it seems to me,, equally acquired
a prior right to all such waters so diverted and beneficially used by him, which may not be disturbed or interferred with or diminished by any subsequent claimant to the extent of depriving or preventing him of the
use of such water so acquired and enjoyed, at least not
without restoring or otherwise furnishing him at the
orifice of his well, at the expense of such claimant,
waters from the basin in quantity and quality as theretofore diverted and used by him from his well." (Emphasis ours).
Although the opinion in the Wrathall case was very
lengthy, the ,Court did not define the relief to which plaintiff was entitled, since the only issue raised on the appeal
was Whether or not the demurrer to the oomplaint should
be sustained. In Justesen vs. Olsen, 86 Uta:h 158, 40 P. 2d,
802, decided one week later, the Court was more explicit.
In the Justesen ease, plaintiff in 1889 drove six wells and
in 1901 drilled an additional wen on his land, all of which
had a combined flOMT of 7 galLons per minute. There had
always existed some small springs on plaintiff's land. In
1916 defendants drove a few flowing wells on their property
with no noticeable effect on plHintiff's springs and wells.
In August, 1B27, defendant drilled a large pump well within 500 yards of plaintiff's wells and springs, and installed
a pump and diverted from 525 to 900 gallons pe,r minute.
There was a direct connection between plaintiff's wells and
defendant's pump well, the latter interferring with the flow
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of plaintifrs well. This CoW"t held that plaintiff ·had a vested right to divert his water by means of artesian pressure,
and was entitled to an injunction enjoining Hnd restraining
the defendant from operating his pump well when the
flow of plaintiff's well was less than 7 gallons per minute.
In a separate ·concurring opinion, Chief Justice Straup
stated the right of the prior appropriator must be protected,

but instead of enjoining the subsequent appropriator he
should be permitted to replace to the prior appropriator
at the orifice of his well waters from the basin undiminished in quantity and quality as theretofore appropriated
by him to the extent that his waters may be diminished
by the pumping of the subsequent appropriator.
Thus, it is clear under the decisions of the Wrathall
and Justeson cases that the means of diversion of prior appropriators from underground artesian basins will be protected by the courts. Both cases involved an invasion of
the right of the prior appropriator by reducing the artesian
pressure below the swface of the ground and thereby causing his well to cease flowing. There can be no room for
doubt that the Wrathall case stands for the proposition that
an interference with the means of diversion by artesian
pressure by a subsequent appropriator is actionable. The
Justeson case stands for the proposition that injunctive relief is a proper remedy against such interference by a subsequent appropriator.
All of the opinions in the Wrathall and Justeson cases
frankly recognize that prior to that time neither the Court,
the State Engineer's Office, nor the bar or public generally
had construed the then existing statutes to cover underground water in artesian basins. The various opinions in
view of this fact suggested various legislative changes in
law. Accordingly, the legislature did amend and enact
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laws to meet the changes. The Laws of Utah, 1935, pages
195 to 200, Chapter 105.
It is .particularly noted that as a direct result of the
ooncwTing opinions of Chief Justice Straup in the Wrathall
and Justesoo cases, Section 73-3-23, Utah Code Annotated
1953, was enaated and reads as follows:
"In all cases of appropriation of underground water
the right of replacement is hereby ·granted to any jnn-

ior appropriator whose appropriation may diminish the
quantity or injuriously affect the quality of appropriated underground water in which the right to the use
thereof has ,been established as provided :by law. No
replacement may be made until application in writing
has been made to and approved by the State Engineer.
In all cases replacements shall be at rthe sole cost and
expense of the applicant and subject to such rules and
regulations as the State Engineer may prescribe. The
right of eminent domain is !hereby granted to any applicant for the puvpose of replacement as provided here-

in.''
The enactment of the focegoing statute clearly reflects
the intent of the legislature to protect the rights of the
prior appropriators, including his means of diversion. This
protection runs to his right to the ar.tesian pressure as a
means of diverting his water. The most recent case which
construed the 1935 amendments as they apply to the protection of the rights of a prior appropriator from an artesian basin was Hanson vs. Salt Lake City, 115 Uta:h 404,
205 P. 2d, 255. We believe that the Hanson case reilterates
and reaffirms the principles of law set forth in the Wrathall and Justeson ·cases, as they are reflected by the comprehensive 1935 statutory amendments.. In that case Hanson owned a well situated in Salt Lake Cou.nlty, aJbout 260
feet deep, which flowed aJbout 50 gallons per minute. The
water flowed from his well and operated a hyd~aulic ram
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which lifted about 10% of the water into a tank, which was
beneficially used, and 90% of the water was wasted. The
city drilled a well about 1 ~ miles southeasterly from rthe
Hanson well. The city well was about 500 feet deep, and
was perforated along the entire casing to pick up water
from all acquifers. A pump was installed on the city well,
and it produced about 8 second feet of water. The well was
pumped from August 21, 1934, to Ootober 17, 1934, and
was operated some in 1935 and 1936. The pwnping of the
city well caused the flow of Hanson's well to decrease from
50 gallons per minute to about 4 gallons per minute. The
reduced flow was insufficient to operate the hydraulic ram,
and Hanson installed a pump on his well. The evidence was
undisputed that the city well and the Hansen well tapped
the same underground basin in which there were located
approximately 6000 wells, flowing and pumped. The evidence further showed that the only interference by the city
well with the Hanson well occurred for a few months in
1934 and the flow of his well never decreased below 4
GPM. The trial court awarded Hanson damages and derued the injunction. This Court reversed the judgment with
directions to dismiss the complaint. The prevailing opinion acknowledged Hanson's right to compensation for the
alleged interference. Since the action was brought over
13 years after the city ceased to pump its \Veil, during which
time Hanson continued to use the pump on his well, the prevailing opinion reasoned that the pump had some value to
plaintiff's operation other than to overcome the effect of
interference from defendant's well. It was pointed out that
the pump was an improvement to his system which he had
used for a period of about 13 years, although the city's
pumping affected the flow of Hanson's well for a period of
only a few months, and that the flow of his well never diminished beloW 4 G.P.M., It was for these two reasons
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and these two reasons alone that this Court held Hanson
was not entitled to recover his damages.
On page 18 of the Irrigation Company's brief, it states
that the Harison ease made the first major departure from
the concept that a prior appvopriator got a vested right in
pressure, stands for the principle that there is no vested
right in an unreasonable means of diversion, and that the
reason ·Hanson was denied recovery was because Hanson's
means of diversion was unreasonable. They do not specify
whether they mean that Hanson's method of diversion by
artesian pressure in and of itself was unreasonable, or
whether Hanson's use of the hydraulic ·ram, which wasted
90% of the water diverted, was unreasonable. We submit
that nowhere in the prevailing opinion of the Hanson case
is it stated or even inferred that the means of diversion by
artesian pressure in and of itself was unreasonable. In
fact, we are convinced that the prevailing opinion ·recognizes that the use of artesian pressure is an accepted, reasonable means of diversion, and will be protected by the
courts. We believe that the Irrigation Oompany completely
ignores the reasoning by Mr. Justice Wade, and his pronouncement o[ the correct principles of water law as they
apply to the facts of that ·case. This becomes apparent
when the oonclusion reached by the prmrailing opinion,
speaking through Mr. Justice Wade, is read. On page 263
he states:
"We conclude that the waters of artesian basins are
subject to appropriation in this state, and that the fi.rst
appropriator obtains a prior right to the use of such
water over subsequent appropriators, and that includes
his means of diversion as long as such means are reasonably efficient, and do not unreasonably waste water.
It follows that where a subsequent appropriator draws
a sufficient quantity of water out of an artesian basin
to lower the static head pressure of a prior appropri-
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ator's well, so that additional costs are required to lift
sufficient water from :his well to satisfy his previously
established beneficial use of such waters, the subsequent appropriator must bear the additional expense."
The Irrigation Company goes to great lengths in its
brief in urging that this Court disregard the fundamental
principle that the means of diversion of the prior appropriator be protected. We believe that this principle is so inherent in the doctrine of appropriation, that any attempt
to deviate therefrom will nndermine and destroy the cornerstones upon which it is fonnded. In support of their argument, they rely upon the author Wells A. Hutchins, and
quote extensively from his book "Selected Problems in the
Law of Water Rights in the West.'' Every argument which
they present in support of a deviation from this well settled
rule was presented to this Court in the Hanson case, and
was rejected as being unsound.
The Irrigation Company argues that the State is interested in the fullest conservation and the highest development and utilization of all of its water which is possible
without endangering the supplies, and that if a subsequent
appropriator in an artesian basin is required not only to lift
his own water out of the basin, but to pay the added expense caused to all prior appropriators by lowering the
static head pressure, then the cost to the SUJbsequent appropriator will become prohibitive, and the waters of the
basin cannot be developed and utilized to the extent that
they could without depleting the supply. Mr. Justice Wade
answers the foregoing argument in the Hanson case on page
263 of the Pacific Reporter, by stating that if such rule prevails then in many cases subsequent appropriators may
draw the water out of the basin so the static head pressure
is so low that the cost of bringing the water to the surface
is prohibitive to the prior appropriator, and then the sub1
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sequent appropriator will be aJble to obtain all the water
from the prior appropriator without paying a cent therefor.
He then points out that in the Horne case, the Wrathall
case and the Justeson case, the Court intervened to prevent
such a result. In rejecting the suggested rule as being unsolUld, Mr. Justice Wade gives approval rtJo the rule that the

expense to a prior appvopriator caused by a subsequent appropriator taking water from an artesian basin, and thereby
lowering the static head pressure, must be borne by the subsequent appropriator. On page 263 he states as follows:

"* • • Such a rule gives proper reward rto the person
who first discovers and develops the water and stabilizes his right, and is in harmony with the long established policy of this state that a later appropriation
may not interfere with the use of water by a prior appropriation in the manner which he has become accustomed to use such water."
The Irrigation Company extensively argues that in the
interest of serving the most people, each appropriator should
make his appropriation with the understanding that his
rights are subject to the static head pressure being lowered,
and that when it is he must stand the expense of bringing
his own water ,to the surface, and in that way only can the
greatest development of the water of fue basin be obtamed.
In support of the foregoing argument, the Irrigation Company quotes at length from the book written by Wells A.
Hutchins, "Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights
in the West." The very same argument was presented to
this Court ·and rejected in the Hanson case. Mr. Justice
Wade again squarely answered the foregoing argument in
the Hanson case on page 262 of the Pacific Reporter, and
pointed out that the suggestion that all appropriators under this law would make their appropriartions with notice
that when and if it became necessary in the opinion of the
1
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State Engineer for the fullest utilization of the water to
lower the ~static head pressure of the basin, then any ap.
propriator would 'have to stand his own ~ occasioned
thereby, is impossible because these appropriators' rights
were estaJblished many years 'before his law ·was enacted.
He then states:
"Our 1935 water laws did not contemplate that the
rights of prior appropriators would be limited as above
suggested.''
Mr. Justice Wade then refers to Section 73-3-23, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, quoted ·above, and points out that
under that statute the right of replacement is granted to
any junior appropriator whose appropriation may diminish
the quantity or injuriously affect the quality of the prior
appropriated underground water, and replacement shall be
at the sole cost and expense of the applicant. He then

states:
"This clearly indicates the legislative policy that later
appropriators shall stand all the expense which such

appropriation causes to prior appropriators."
The Irrigation Company devotes a considerable portion of its brief to its assertion that to maintain an artesian
condition in an underground basin causes leaks and wasting of water which can be saved and utilized by lowering the
static head pressure. This Court has consistently permitted a junior appropriator to appropriate water saved by
constructing works designed to save the water wasted Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243,
289 P. 116. In none of those cases did this Court require
or did the applicant even claim that he had a right to require the prior appropriator to pay the cost of that water
saving.
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The facts of the instant ease are almost identical with
the facts of Wrath·all vs. Johnson, supra, and Justeson vs.
Olson, >Supra, since the areal extent of the artesian basin
is relatively small, and there are only a limited number of
appropriators invoJved. Under the foregoing cases there
can he no room f.or doubt that Fowkes' prior right to the
use of the water, including their means of diversion iby artesian pressure, is protected. Hanson vs. Salt Lake City,
supra, in no way tends to overrule either case, but expressly
upholds and affirms the principles of law therein announced.
Utah is the only state among those which have statutory procedures which has a so-ealled replacement statute
(73-3-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Hutchins, supra,
recognizes this and on page 176 states as follows:
"The Utah Law covers all ground waters, and gives the
junior appropriator the right of replacement of water,
at his sole expense, if his proposed development will
diminish the quantity or injuriously affect the quality
of ground water already appropriated."
The author of the law review article in 28 Rocky Mountain Law Review, on page 379, also gives this point recognition. On page 379, he states:
"The Utah solution, perhaps the best so far, recognizes
the right (to artesian pressure) , but allows the junior
appropriator to lower the level if he pays the senior
appropriator for any increased cost in bringing water
to the surface."
The overwhelming weight of authority in th~ other
western states gives protection to the prior appr.opriators
to continue his means of diversion (Pima Farms Company
vs. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369; Noh vs. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P. 2d, 1112; City of Lodi vs. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P. 2d, 439; Faden vs.
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Hubbell, 93 Col. 358, 28 P. 2d, 247; Karl F. Hehl Engineering Co. vs. Hubbell, 132 Col. 96, 285 P. 2d 593; State Ex
Rei Crowley vs. District Court, 108 Montana 89, 88 P. 2d,
23; Annotation Appropriation of Water as Creating Right,
as Against Subsequent Appropriator, to Continue Method or
Means of Diversion, 121 ALR, 1044). It is noted that in the
case of Crowley vs. District Court, 108 Montana 89, 88 P.
2d 23, cited on page 27 of the Irrigation Company's brief,
the Montana Court held that as against a subsequent appropriator of water from a river, although a sufficient quantity of water was left in the stream to which the prior appropriator was entitled, the subsequent appropriator ·was
required to stand the expense of altering and lowering the
diversion works of the prior appropriator. The court suggested that the rtest of reasonableness is determined by the
standards in existence at the time of the original appropriation and not at the time of the subsequent appropriation.
The argument of the Irrigation Company, when
stripped to its bare essentials, urges this Court to hold, as
a matter of law, that diversion of water by means of artesian pressure is in and of itself an unreasonable means of
diversion. Under the facts of this case, we are at a loss to
understand how the Irrigation Company can seriously contend that Fowkes do not have a vested right to the artesian
·pressure because such means of diversion is unreasonable,
and still -contend that they have the right to take the very
same pressure away from Fowkes and utilize it to divert
their water. Certainly, if Fowkes' means of diversion by
artesian pressure is unreasonable, so is the diversion by artesian pressure by defendants unreasonable. In addition
thereto, the Irrigation Company wastes 50% Olf the water
diverted :from the underground in transit and storage, according to the testimony of David I. Gardner (R. 57-62).
Although the trial court ordered this testimony stricken,
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it deserved consid&ation in view of rthe position taken by the
Irrigation Company. The contention of the Irrigation Company is best described by the old adage, "the pot ·calling the
kettle black."
The Irrigation Company then asserts that the Fowkes
should be required to expend monies and labor to change
their means of diversion, by installing pumps, motors, transformers, and other pumping equipment at Fowkes' own expense and be perpetually burdened with the cost of pumping, while the Irrigation Company diverts its water by artesian pressure, and should not be required to pay one red
cent. To support its argument, the Irrigation Company
asserts that for this Court to hold otherwise will ,require
some farmer down in Milford to lift 40,000 acre feet of water for the other farmers before he can get one acre foot
for himself. Yet it completely ignores the great injustice which would result in this case. It argues that it would
oost the subsequent appropriator so much that he shouldn't
pay anything. We submit that not one reason which they
cite in support of their argument exists in this case. We
do not here have a fact situation where the ground water
basin covers an areal extent of 90 square miles and where
there are 125 irrigation wells annually pumping 40,000 acre
feet of water. Nor do we have a greatly populated area
in which there are 6000 wells located within a small radius.
We do not have a fact situation which would make it economically impractical for the Irrigation Company to lift
its water and Fowkes' water too, since the fact is that the
Irrigation Company gets its water 1by artesian pressure
without any lift or cost whatever. Nor do we have a fact
situation where the prior appropriator has a small well flowing only a few gallons per minute, but the Fowkes wells are
in the main irrigation wells with a combined flow of 1.775
second feet, as compared to 2.74 second feet of combined
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flow from the liTigation Company wells. We do have a
relatively small alluvial fan with artesian conditions whereby the artesian pressure in the Fowkes wells has been depleted by the Irrigation Company wells, and that very same
artesian pressure is used by the Irrigation Company to divert its water. We emphasize that this dispute is a flowing
well vs. flowing well controversy, and the main issue is as
between the prior appropriator and the junior appropriator of water by artesian pressure; who is going to stand
the expense of ehanging the means of diversion of the prior
appropriator which has been rendered useless by the act af
the subsequent appropriator. We submit that justice and
fair play dictates that such expense must be borne by the
subsequent appropriator and is in harmony with the well
established principle, as announced time and time again by
this Court, that the means of diversion of the prior appropriator shall be protected.
Although we have dwelled on this point longer than
we anticipated, we would make this further observation.
If the rule asserted by the Irrigation Company should prevail, the doctrine of appropriation would crumble in this
state. There would be no such thing as a prior right. Subsequent appropriators with their larger and more efficient
pumping equipment could draw the water out of the basin
so that the static head pressure is so low that the cost of
bringing the water to the surface is prohibitive to the prior
appropriator, and then the subsequent appropriator will be
able to obtain all the water from the prior appropriator
without paying a cent therefor. If we take Utah Lake for
an example, it is a matter of common knowledge that there
is unappropriated water in Utah Lake, and that the maximum pumping lift would be less than 13 feet. Under such
a rule, new appropriators could come in and pump water
in extensive quantities from Utah Lake without diminish-
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ing the quantity of water necessary to satisfy the prior appropriators. The subsequent appropriators could well contend that the prior appropriators would have to stand their
O\Vll expense in pumping the waters which were theretofore diverted by gravity flow, and for increasing the pmnping lift on the waters theretofore pumped. Going one step
f~er, and making a parallel with the facts of this case,
what would preclude the subsequent appropriator from
taking his water from Utah Lake by gravity flow without
any cost to him and then asserting that the prior appropriators should be required to install larger pumping equipment
at their own expense, and pay the additional cost in lifting
their water, since the maximum lift would be less than 13
feet, and would be an economical pwnping lift. Certainly
this Court would not condone such a principle, or even listen to the argument. Carrying the ,argument of the Irrigation Company to its logical conclusion, all prior appropriators could be required to line and water-proof their canals and ditches or place the same in pipe lines at their own
expense in order that the carrier water may be conserved
and utilized by subsequent appropriators without any cost
to them whatever. We submit that the trial court did not
err in holding that under the facts of this the Fowkes have
a vested right in their means of diversion by artesian pressure, and that any expense in the alteration of such means
of diversion must be borne by the subsequent appropriator.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS
ORDER REQUIRING REPLACElVIENT OF THE WATER,
IN THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE
QUANTITY OF WATER APPROPRIATED BY THE VARIOUS PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NUMBER 3770,
TO SUPPORT THE ORDER FOR REPLACEMENT.
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The Irrigation Company contends that the Fowkes did
not prove the quantity of water to which tlhey are entitled.
The I·rrigation Company does not deny that the Fowkes
have made a valid appropriation from each of their wells.
There is no issue made that the priority of the appropriations from each well has not been proved, nor that the acreages irrigated, the number of persons served with domestic water, nor the number and kind of stock supplied with
stockwatering have not been proved. Yet, each and every
one of these elements of the appropriations by the Fowkes
were proved by the undergrormd water claims. The Irrigation Company singles out only the quantity of water appropriated, and claims that the same has not been proved
The sole issue, therefore, is whether the WldergroWld water claims of the Fowkes are prima facie evidence of the
rights stated therein. Underground water claims covering
each of the Fowkes wells were received in evidence (Pl. Ex.
1). The Irrigation Company put on no evidence to rebut
the facts stated in any of the underground water claims.
During the 1935legislature, Section 73-5-10, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, was enacted for the purpose of making a
matter of record all rights to the use of underground water
which had been acquired by use prior to March 22, 1935.
(Laws 1935, Chapter 105, Page 200). That portion of the
first sentence of the original act quoted on page 29 of the
Irrigation Company's brief leaves out a very important part
thereof. The first sentence reads as follows:
"Within one year after the date of the approval of this
act, all claimants to rights to the use of underground
water shall file notice of such claim or claims, with the
State Engineer on forms furnished by him, setting
forth such information as the State Engineer may require, including but not limited to the following:"
(Emphasis OW'S)
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The last paragraph of the f,oregoing act made failw-e
to file notice of such claims prima facie evidence of intent
to aJbandon the claimed right. In 1937, Section 73-5-11,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was enacted for the purpose
of extending the time within which to file such undergronnd
water claims, and in addition thereto, contained a provision
to allow the State Engineer to withdraw fees for filing such
claims, deposited in the general fund for the purpose of defraying expenses incurred by the State Engineer in surveying the location of the wells covered by such underground
water claims (Laws of 1937, Chapter 130, Page 243). Section 73-5-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, has since been
amended four different times to extend the time within
which to file underground water claims, and has validated
the filing of all such claims filed since 1935.
In 1949, Section 73-5-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
was enacted to make provision for making a matteT of ,record of all rights to the use of water both surface and underground (Laws of 1949, Chapter 97, Section 3). In an
effort to eliminate the duplication in the provision of Section 73-5-11, UtaJh Code Annotated, 1953, and Section 73-513, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, making a matter of record
the rights to the use of underground water and for the further purpose of extending the time indefinitely within which
to file such claims (29th Biennial Report of State Engineer,
Page 76), Section 73-5-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
Section 73-5-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were repealed
in their entirety, and Section 73-5-13, Utah Code Annotated~ 1953, was amended by the laws of 1955, ·Chapter 160,
Page 312, The last paragraph of Section 73-5-13, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended in 1955, now reads as follows:
"Such notices of claim, or claims, as provided in this
Section, shall be prima facie evidence of claimed right
or rights therein described."
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The trial court ruled ~t since the foregoing ·statute was
a rule of evidence enacted by the legislature, the effect
therof was retroactive and the Fowkes claims were
entitled to the benefit of the statute. On page 33 of the
Irrigation Company's ~brief, it is conceded that the legislature has such rule making power. The Irrigation Company argues, however, that since the Fowkes claims were
filed pursuant to the 1935 statute, that such claims are not
entitled to the prima facie effect given them under the 1955
amendment. With this argument we cannot agree. In the
first place, the 1935 Act contained substantially the same
language as the 1955 Amendment in that it required the
claimant to set forth "* * * such information as the State
Engineer may require''. In the second place the identical
form of undergrOWld water claims has been used since the
1949 Enactment and the 1955 Amendment as was used pursuant to the original act of 1935. In the third place, complete chaos and confusion would result if the undergrotmd
water claims filed pursuant to the original act of 1935 were
given different evidentiary effect from those filed pursuant to the 1949 enactment, and still a different evidentiary
effect given to those filed pursuant to the 1955 amendment.
It could well be that the legislature anticipated the confusion which would come about with the co-existence of the
original act of 1935, and the 1949 enactment covering the
same claims to underground water. For this reason, the
original act of 1935 was repealed and Section 73-5-13, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, was amended in 1955 to include all
claims within one statute.
The purpose of the statute in giving the prima facie
effect to such claims is to protect the old rights. This becomes apparent when it is observed that the older the rights
become the more difficult it becomes to prove such rights
by the testimony of witnesses. It gives reward to those
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daimants who were diligent B:Jld ~ed their_ elaims pursuant
to the original act of 1935. It would be somewhat absurd
to argue that those claimants who were dilatory and did
not file their c;laims for twenty ·years after the original act
of 1935 should be rewarded by making their ~claims prima
facie evidence of the rights claimed and penalize rthose who
were diligent in filing their claims pursuant to the original
act of 1935 by making their elaims only prima facie evidence of what they claim. In our judgment, the argument
of the Irrigation Company that claims filed pursuant to the
original aot of 1935 are prima facie evidence of what the
claimant claims is meaningless. If such claims are limirted
to that effect, they are nort worth the paper upon which they
are written. We believe that such claims are worth something more than that, and so did the legislasture when in
1955 ilt made such elaims prima facie evidence of the rights
claimed therein.
The Irrigation Company goes into great detail discussing Section 73-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The foregoing Section applies exclusively rto proof of appropriation
of water rights which have been initiated by filing an application to appropriate the same with rthe State Engineer,
and we do not believe that the Irrigation Company contends otherwise. There can be no question about the fact
that the foregoing statute does not apply to elaims -covering either surface or underground water.
The Fowkes made out a prima facie case of their appropriation not only with respect to priority, acreage irrigated, persons and stock supplied, hut also with respect to
the quantity of water by placing in evidence their underground water claims filed with the State Engineer. The
Irrigation Company put in no evidence to rebut the prima
facie proof. On page 34 of the Irrigation Company's brief,
it is asserted that the flows are obviously estimated. Plain-
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tiffs John L. Fowkes and Heber J. Fowkes, who are the
original claim.a.nts under eight of the eleven underground
water claims, testified as witnesses in this case, and the Irrigation Company had ample opportunity by cross examination to determine whether or not such flows were estimates. This the Irrigation Company neglected to do for
reasons known only to itself, therefore it should not now
be heard to complain.
A further aspect of this problem becomes apparent
when it is observed that the Fowkes wells ceased flowing as
a resulrt of the wrongful act of the Irrigation Company. It
caused the Fowkes' well to cease flowing and destroys any
present means of measuring the flows of water therefrom.
It then asserts thaJt the Fowkes should not be entitled to
recover because they cannot prove the flow of warter from
their wells. This is consistent with the argument heretofore asserted by the Irrigation Company that the late comer should be rewarded for his wrongful acts. Such a rule
would leave the door open to subsequent appropriators rto
come in and rtake water from the basin, cause the wells of
the prior appropriators to cease flowing, and then be immune from liability because the prior appropriator could
not prove the flow of water from his well prior to the
wrongful act of the subsequent appropriator.
We submit that the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3770
proved their prior appropriations by placing in evidence
their underground water claims which were admittedly filed
and recorded in the office of the State Engineer. In support thereof, we again call attention to the case of Hanson
vs. Salt Lake City, supra, wherein, on page 261 of the Reporter, it is stated as follows:

*

"• • • We, therefore, conclude and hold • * *that
by filing his (Hanson's) claims to such right to use
such waters in accordance with the 1935 Statute, he
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has established that right with a priority dating from
his first use.''
We further submit ~that the trial court did not err in
entering its order requiring replacement of the water since
there is proof of the quantity of water appropriated by the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3770 to support an order for replacement.
POINT ill
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING THE
IRRIGATION COMPANY AND ANDREWS TO EACH
REPLACE HALF THE WATER, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT AN APPORTIONMENT OF REPLACEMENT COST, AND THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
ONLY CAUSE FOR DIMUNITION IN THE PLAINTIFF'S
WELL WAS INTERFERENCE BY ANDREWS AND
THE IRRIGATION COMPANY.
We shall endeavor to follow the form of the Irrigation
Company brief by discussing under Boint 3 the last three
points covered by its designation of points on appeal.

(a) The Trial Court Did Not Ignore The Whole Priority System.

The trial,court found that the drilling and use of water
from rthe Andrews pump well and from the Irrigation Company wells have interferred with and have interrupted the
flow of water from the eighteen flowing wells and springs
having prior rights, and have reduced the pressure in said
flowing wells and in the springs to the point that effective
future use thereof will require the installation of pumps
or other means of securing the water therefrom (Finding
No. 12, P. 168).
The problem is somewhat complicated by the fact rthat
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Andrews owns seven of the eighteen flowing wells and Andrews failed to sustain the burden of proof to show the net
effect orf the interference caused to their flowing wells and
springs by the liTigation Company flowing wells as op..
posed to and distinguished from the effect caused by their
own pwnp well (Finding No. 15, P. 169). Insofar as Fowkes
are concerned, both Andrews and the Irrigation Company
are wrongdoers and Fowkes are entitled to relief both as
against the Irrigation Company and Andrews. Charvoz
vs. Bonneville Irrigation District, 120 Utah 480, 235 Pac.
2d 780. The problem then ·becomes simply one of apportioning the costs of replacement between Andrews and the
Irrigation Company and the apportionment of such costs
is a dispute between them, and should be of no concern to
Fowkes. The burden of showing the apportionment was
either on the Irrigation Company or Andrews or both.
Either or both of them failed to sustain the burden of showing an apportionment different from thart found by the trial

court.
The trial court foood that Andrews pump well will
pump approximately six second feet of water (Finding No.
4, P. 167) and the Irrigation Company's flowing wells flow
2.74 second feet of water (Finding No. 5, P. 167). The total
withdrawal from the basin by the five Irrigation Company
wells for one year at the foregoing rate of flmv would be
1980 acre feet (R. 57). During 1954 the Andrews pump
well was started in May and ended approximately the first
of November (Vol. 2, P. 103). The period of withdrawal
would be approximately five and one-half months, or one
hundred sixty-five days. The total quantity of water withdrawn from the basin during that period at the rarte of six
second feet would be approximately 1,980 acre feet. It is
apparent that the tot:al wirthdrawal by the Irrigation Company flowing wells for a twelve month period would be
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equal to the total withdra"\¥al by ·the Andrews pump well
during the irrigation season. The trial court, therefore,
apportioned the cost of replacemenrt equally among Andrews and the Irrigation Company. Such apportionment is
supported by the evidence, and in a:bsence of a showing by
either the Irrigation Company or 'Andrews of a better apportionment of the replacement costs, the order of the trial
court should stand.
On page 35 of the Irrigation Company's brief it complains that the trial eourt ignored the difference in priorities between the Irrigation Company flowing wells and the
Andrews pump well. One solution to this problem would
be to require the Irrigation Company, having the latest prioritY, to stand the total cost of replacement. We believe,
however, that this is a dispute between the Irrigation Company and Andrews. We have no dispute with the findings
of the trial court that Andrews has declared it to be his
intention to drill another well and to withdraw an additional six second feet. Nor do we have any dispute with the
findings of the trial court that the Irrigation Company is
granted the right to pump its wells. The Fowkes means o[
diversion has been depleted and a further lowering of the
water table would ~be .immaterial. It should make no difference to the Fowkes whether the water table is lowered
an additional one hundred feet by Andrews and the Irrigation Company so long as the water to which Fowkes are
entitled to use is replaced to them. .
(b) It is Immaterial That Others Are Withdrawing
Water from the Basin Under Junior Priorities In the Vicinity of Nephi Since Any Possible Interference Caused
Thereby is Very Remote and Speculative.
.We do not believe thast rthe evidence conclusively shows
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that developments in the vicinity of Nephi have a direct ef.
feet on the artesian basin from which the Fowkes have
appropriated their water, and it was not error for the court
to ignore the Nephi development. In a somewhat desper..
ate effort to place the blame of interference on someone
else, the Irrigation Company presented some evidence of
the drilling of wells on the Salt Creek Fan west of Nephi,
which is approximately ten miles sourth from the wells in
question (Volume 2, P. 62). Mr. Mayo was asked directly
whether in his opinion the drilling of the wells in the Nephi
area has any effect on the Fowkes wells (R. 21). His answer was as follows:
"Well, from what information we have in the State
Engineer's Office and from an appreciation of the complexity of the subsurface geology and the ·hydrauli<S
of the aquifers that would appear to exist in the valley,
there doesn't seem to be any likelihood that any recent
development m the Nephi area could materially affect
the wells in the vicinity of the Mona Reservoir.''
Mr. Gardner expressed his opinion that the source of
supply to the Fowkes wells does not come directly from any
sources to the south of North Canyon (R. 44) . The Irrigation Company's own witness, Dr. Hansen, testified that
any effect on the pressure in the Fmvkes wells caused by
the development or drilling of wells in the Nephi area would
be very remote (R. 159). He further testified that any inter-connection of underground water between the Salt Crook
Fan and the fan on which the Fowkes wells are locaJted
would have to be through the coalesced fingers of the alluvial fan and that the material at ·the place where they coalesce
is finer than it is further back up the fan and the restriction on the movement of the water would be greater (R.
168). Therefore, two wells on the same fan would affect
each other much more noticeably than a well on another
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fan which might coalesce through this fine material (R.
168) . Dr. Hansen further testified that it was possible that
the fault which traverses the valley ,in the vicinity of the
Burriston Springs could force to the surface all underground
water moving to the north from Nephi (R. 196). All of rthe
foregoing evidence is fwther supported by Pl. Exh. PlO,
which contained three separate hydrographs of three wells
spaced between Nephi and Mona. The hydrographs are
explained by Mr. Mayo (R. 16-17). The top line represents
the hydrograph of a well situated west of Mona. The middle line represents the hydrograph of a well situated midway between Mona and Nephi. The bottom line represents
the hydrograph of a well situated west of Nephi. Mr. Mayo
testified that the foregoing hydrographs when considered
with the information on plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 ·show some
characteristics that would indicate that the ground water
development in the Nephi area is not showing its influence
in the vicinity of the Star Ranch (R. 28).
We submit, therefore, that the evidence shows that
any development of water in the Nephi area is immaterial,
and that any possible interference which might be caused
thereby is very remote and speculative. We fwther submit that the trial court did not err in concluding that the
only cause for dimunition in the Fowkes' wells was the interference by Andrews pump well and the Irrigation Company wells.

(c) Any Evidence That Shows That Mona Reservoir
Would Receive The Total Overflow From The Basin Is Immaterial And The Trial Court Properly Ignored This.
In one last futile attempt to justify its wrongful act,
the liTigation Company asserts that the Mona Reservoir
picks up the total overflow from the ground water basin.
In the first .Place, ~their assertion is based upon supposition
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and conjecture. The only direct testimony of the water of
any Particular spring reaching the Mona Reservoir was by
John Roundy with respect to the Andrews spring (R. 255).
Max Thomas testified that there are sources of recharge in
the form of springs and surface runoff to the Mona Reservoir, but he didn't state where such springs were located
(Vol. 2, P. 87). There is no evidence to show that the reservoir picks up the total overflow 'from the artesian basin.
This may or may not be a geological fact. Any evidence
in support of such a fact in the record is based upon general opinion of the usual conditions and is not based upon
any detailed investigation. In any event, there is no evidence in the record to show the quantity of such overflow.
The mere fact that the Irrigation Company drilled five large
wells to develop water from the basin defeats its own argument. Otherwise, why would the Irrigation Company
spend between $41,000.00 and $45,000.00 (Vol. 2, P. 82),
$15,000.00 of which was borrowed from the Utah Water
and Power Board interest free (Vol. 2, P. 84) to drill the
five large irrigation wells if it was getting the water anyway by overflow into Mona Reservoir.

We submit that any evidence that the Mona Reservoir
would receive the overflow from the basin is immaterial,
and the trial court did not err in ignoring this.
POINT IV
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT INSOFAR
AS IT AWARDED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND ORDERED REPLACEMENT TO FOWKES WAS PROPER.
In appellant Andrews' brief, they designate three different points on appeal in Case Number 3770. Fowkes are
primarily concerned with the points designated therein as
Point 2 and Point 6, and will endeavor to answer both un-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
der the common he~ding of this point as designated above.
Fowkes wholeheartedly concur with the ar~ent presented under Point 5 designated by appellant Andrews. Although the fact that the Irrigation Company wastes 50%
of the water which it diverts from the underground basin
becomes immaterial to Fowkes under the relief granted by
the trial coUrt, we believe that this Court should keep such
fact in mind in considering appellant Irrigation Company's
argument under Point 1 of its brief.
Fowkes are somewhat in a neutral comer in the controversy between Andrews and the Irrigation Company with
respect to how the cost of replacement shall be apportioned.
The evidence conclusively shows that both the Andrews
Pump Well and the five Irrigation Company flowing wells
have interferred with and have reduced the pressure in the
Fowkes wells and spring, such that they will have to be
pumped, and the trial court so found (Finding No. 12, P.
168). Once that was shown there can :be no dispute about
the right of Fowkes to recover against both the Irrigation
Company and Andrews. We believe that the burden was
upon either or both the Irrigation Company and Andrews
to show the relative interference caused by their wells to
the Fowkes wells. It might well be that as between the two
the burden was upon the liTigation Company to make the
showing, as is argued in Andrews' brief. Since either one
or both have failed to prove their relative interference, we
believe that the apportionment ordered by ,the trial court
should stand, since there is ample evidence in the record to
support it. As pointed out in our discussion under Point
Nwnber ITI herein, it would seem that the equitable manner
in which to apportion such costs rshould be based upon the
relative quantities of water withdrawn from this basin, since
,1Jhat is the cause in fact of the reduction of the static head
pressure. We have demonstrated that Andrews ~and the
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l:rrigation Company annually withdraw an equal quantity
of water from this basin, being approximately 1980 acre
feet each year. In view of the foregoing, there exists in the
rec~ ample evidence for apportioning the costs equally,
Which the trial court did.

Andrews argue and the Irrigation Company makes
some claim that the court ignored ·the fact that the Irrigation Company's flowing wells have a la!ter priority than the
Andrews pump well Certainly the Irrigation Company
should have no cause to complain, since it could well be, as
Andrews argue, that the Irrigation Company, having the
lata9t: priority, should stand the whole expense. To answer
the argument of Andrews, if there devolves upon us a duty
to do so, iJt must be borne in mind that the rights of the Irrigation Company in the five flowing wells, and the righ~
<;>f An·drews in the Andrews Pump Well are evidenced only
by approved applications to appropriate water which pres.
ently are merely an inchoate righrt which may ripen into a
vested right upon compliance with the statutory procedure.
McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P. 2d 288. It is
conceivable and very possible that either of the applications
might lapse and cause a reduction in priority for various
reasons at any time until certificate of appropriation is issued (Section 73-3-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). It
could well be that because of this uncertainty the trial court
gave very little weight to the present relative priorities of
th Andrews Pump Well and the IrrigaJtion Company flowing wells.
The Fowkes merely want the water to which they have
shown they are entitled, and it makes no difference to them
whether they receive it by a restoration of the artesian conditions, or whether it is replaced to them by the subsequent
appropriators who have destroyed those conditions. They
have n.o practical concern as to how the costs or repJ.a.re.
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ment are to be apportioned unless the inability to apportion
such eosts should defeat the right of Fowkes to recover.
Since there has been no showing by either the Irrigation
Company or Andrews of a different basis for apportioning
the replacement eosts, and since the evidence supports the
basis found by the trial,court, we think the order of the trial
court should stand. We submit, therefore, that the Decree
of the trial court, insofar as it awarded injunctive relief and
ordered replacement to Fowkes, is supported by the evidence and was wholly proper.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT UNDER THE FACfS OF TillS CASE
FOWKES HAD A DUTY TO MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES AND IN HOLDING THAT FOWKES ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR DAMAGES FOR LOSS
OF CROPS AND FOR HAULING WATER BECAUSE
THEY FAILED TO MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES.
The trial court found that Fowkes suffered a pecuniary
loss of $1500.00 for crops not grown and for hauling water
during the period in controversy (Finding No. 16, P. 169).
The trial court further found that Fowkes could have mitigated their damages by taking the necessary steps to secure water which was still available from the underground
area during the existence of this controversy, and, by reason thereof, Fowkes were not entitled to recover damages
for loss of ~crops and for hauling water (Finding No. 16, P.
169). We have pointed out under our Statement of Facts
that it would cost approximately $7,700.00 to drill and equip
a well adequate to replace 800 gallons per minute of water
to the Fowkes. In addition thereto, there would be the cost
of a suitable transformer and the cost of power for pump..
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ing. It would cost at least $6,950.00 to test pump and equip
each existing well with a suitable pump. In addition thereto, there would be the cost of suitable transformer and the
cost of pumping. According to the testimony of Mr. Madsen, a witness for the Water and Power Board, the total
cost to equip the existing Fowkes wells with adequate facilities would he $8,464.00. The trial court, therefore, ruled
in effect that Fowkes had a duty to expend between $6,950.00 and $8,464.00 to mitigate $1500.00 damages. From
this ruling, the Fowkes filed their cross appeal.
The rule of mitigation of damages adopted in Utah
is well stated in the case of Jankele vs. Texas Company, 88
Utah 325, 54 P. 2d, 425. On page 428 it is stated:

''* * * One who is injured in this person or property
by wrongful or negligent acts of 'another is bound to
exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid loss
or to minimize the resulting damage and to the extent
rthat his damages are the result of his active and unreasonable enhancement thereof, or are due to his failure to exercise such care and diligence he cannot recover. One who has been injured by the wrongful or
negligent acts of another is bound to protect himself,
if he can do so with reasonable exertion, or at trifling
expense and he can recover from the delinquent party
only such damages as he could not, with reasonable effort, have avoided."
To tlle same effect is 25 CJS, Damages, Section 33,
Page 499; 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Section 27, Page 420 to
422 inelusive. It is pointed out in the Jankele case that the
efforts which the injured party must make to avoid the
consequences of the wrongful act need only be reasonable
under ·the circumstances of the particular case, and· his duty
is limited by the rules of common sense and fair dealing.
Failure to e·xercise reasonable care to m.inim.ize damages
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is not a complete bar, but merely goes to the amount of
damages recoverable. The efforts required of the injured
party to minimize his damages include a reasonable expenditure of money, which he may recover as a part of his
~amages. He is not r~quired to incur large. expenses, since
he must protect himself if he can do so at "trifling expense."
In 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Page 425, it is pointed out that
the word "trifling" has reference to the situation of the parties. It means a sum which is trifling in comparison with
the consequential damages which are sought to be recovered in the particular case. It is apparent without further
argument that the trial court erred in concluding that
Fowkes had a duty to expend a sum of between $6,950.00

to $8,464.00 to mitigate $1,500.00 damages.
. It is noted here that plaintiff, Heber J. Fowkes, had
to haul water in 1956 for his domestic needs (R. 114). He
made 32 trips, or a total of 256 miles (R. 115) . Each trip
took an hour and a half, or a total of 48 hours (R. 115).
The reasonable value to hire someone to drive the tractor
to Mona and back was at least $1.00 per hour (R. 116).
Asstuning a cost of 10c per mile as reasonable and $1.00 per
hour for labor, the reasonable cost of hauling water was
$73.70. There can be no doubt about the fact that the
foregoing ·costs were incurred to mitigate the damages, yet
the trial court refused to award any part thereof.
In 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Page 423, the rule is stated
that in cases of intentional torts the rule of mitigation of
damages does not apply. It is further pointed out in 15 Am.
Jur. Damages, Section 41, Page 441, that in some states
the rule requiring one to minimize his damages does not
apply in cases of intentional or positive and continuous
torts and that if there is an illegal invasion of one's property rights and an intentional or positive and continuous
tort the injured party may recover whatever damage he
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SUStained, even fuough by the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence he could have avoided tl!.e same. The foregoing
is especially true where trespassers have profited by their
torts (Shannon vs. McNabb, 29 ·Okla. 829, 120 P. 268).
In the instant case the defendants diverted water from their
wells for aproximately two years, lmowing that they caused
the wells of plaintiff to cease flowing, yet they continued
to do so and used the water to ·grow and mature their crops
while the crops of the Fowkes burned up.
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect
that in action for damages arising out of eitller breach of
contract or tort, the burden is upon rthe party whose wrongful act caused the damages complained of to prove anything in diminution of the damages, or in other words, that
the damages were lessened or might have been lessened by
reasonable diligence on the part of the aggrieved party.
(Mitigation of Damages-Burden of Proof, 134 ALR 242).
In the case now before the Court, the defendants offered no
evidence to show that the Fowkes could have taken reasonable measures at ''trifling'' expense to minimize their
damages. The only evidence which they presented was to
show that the elevation of the water surface was not more
than 8.5 feet below the ground surface. The defendants
failed to susta.in their burden, and the trial court should
have so held and awarded Fowkes ·their damages. On the
other hand, the Fowkes presented evidence to show that the
cost to mitigate such damages would be between $6,950.00
~and $8,464.00. If the Fowkes had made such expenditures
they ·would have enhanced their damages instead of mitigating them. We seriously doubt that the trial court would
have awarded Fowkes as damages such ~nditures if
made, since such expenditures would grea!tly exceed their
actuall damages found by the trial court. In addition to the
foregoing, we invite the Court's attention to the rule stated
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in 25 CJS Damages, Section 33, Page 502, wherein it is

sta-

ted that plaintiffs' lack of funds to meet the situation presented may excuse efforts to lessen the injury. If the income tax returns of the plaintiffs Fowkes (Exhibits 015,
16, and 19) demonstrate anything in this case, they demonstraJte the lack of financial ability of the Fowkes to make
such large expenditures.
We further invite the Court's attention to the uncertainty which existed during the period of the controversy
as to whether the artesian conditions would return. Can
it be said that a reasonable man, upon first discovering a
reduc1Jion in the flow of water from his well, would immediately purchase expensive pumping equipmenrt, motors and
other facilities to pump his well? We think not. Immediately upon observing the reduction in flow from their wells,
the Fowkes protested to the State Engineer and exhausted
theiT administrative remedies in hope that their means of
diversion would be protected by the State Engineer. When
the State Engineer gave them no relief, they immediately
commenced this action. We submit that the Fowkes did
everything that could be reasonably expected of them under the circumstances. We further submit that the trial
court erred in finding that under the facts of this case
Fowkes had a duty to mitigate their damages, and further
erred in denying Fowkes their damages because of their
failure to mitigate, and that the decree of the trial court
should be reversed, and remanded with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Fowkes and against defendants Irrigation Company and Andrews for $1,500.00.

CONCLUSION
The main controversy presented by this appeal is a
flowing well vs. flowing well dispute. The issue to be resolved is whether the Irrigation Company, as the junior
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appropriator, can with impunity rob the prior appropriators Fowkes of their means of diversion, and to utilize the
same means to divert its own water. In defense of ia
wrongful act, the Irrigation Company asserts that the wa-ter in the Fowkes wells is within 8.5 from the grolUld surface, so the Fowkes ought to be required to install pumping equipment at their own expense to get it. Yet the Irrigation Company, with clear conscience, takes the same artesian press~e which it asserts it had the right to take away
from Fowkes because it is an unreasonable means, and use
it to divert its own water, without any .cost to it whatever.
The Irrigation Company further asserts that it should not
be required to pay the cost of altering Fowkes' means of
diversion, because to do so would follow a principle of law
which would require a junior appropriator in Milford to lift
40,000 acre feet of water for the prior appropriators before
he could use one acre foot for himself. The Irrigation Company ignores the fact that the very reason which it urges
in support of its argument does not exist in this case.
To adopt the rule asserted by the Irrigation Company
would require this Court to overrule every case which it has
decided on this facet of our Utah Water Law.. There would
be no such thing as a prior right. The doctrine of appropriation which has always jealously protected the prior appropriator would have to be discarded. This we believe the
Court will not do. Upon this determination could well rest
the rights of many o\vners of established rights to divert
underground water by means of wells. Great injustice could
result to not only the Fowkes in this case, but to many of
the owners of established \vate:r rights if this Court takes
the wrong road at the "Cross Roads" suggested by the Irrigation Company. We strongly urge that this Court apply
the principles of water law which it has time and time again
announced as being correct.
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It follows without argument that the rule of mitigation
does not require one to expend from between $6,950.00 and
$8,464.00 to mitigate $1,500.00 damages. We submit that
the trial court erred in this respect.
We respectfully submit that the evidence supports the
decree of the trial court insofar as it awarded Fowkes injunctive relief, and ordered replacement of water to Fowkes,
and should be affirmed accordingly. The decree of the trial
court should, however, be reversed and remanded, wirth instructions to enter judgment in favor of Fowkes and
against defendants, Irrigation Company and Andrews, for
$1,500.00.
Respectfully submitted,
PIDLLIP V. CHRISTENSON
JOSEPH NOVAK
for CHRISTENSON, NOVAK & PAULSON
Attorneys for Respondents and Cross
Appellants, Fowkei
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